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CASE NOTES
AUTOMOBILES - LIABILITY OF PRIVATE OWNER OR OPERATOR TO
OCCUPANT - OPERATION OF "GUEST STATUTES." The plaintiff, a minor
accepted an invitation to ride in the defendant's automobile. After en-
tering the automobile, she discovered that her host was under the in-
fluence of liquor and was driving at a high rate of speed in a reckless
manner. Her immediate and repeated demands to be let out of the car
were refused. An accident ensued through the defendant's negligence
when he attempted to pass a truck and the plaintiff sustained severe
and permanent injuries. On this set of facts, the Supreme Court of
Washington he, that judgment for defendant be affirmed. The case
was governed by the Washington "host-guest" statute, which provided
that guests in automobiles have no cause of action for injuries received
in accidents unless the accident was intentional.' As used in the statute,
the term "intentional" means that the host-driver must conceive and
act upon a premeditated intent to injure his guest. Akiz sv. Hemphill, 207
P.2d 196 (Wash. 1949).
The readily discernible result of this and other seemingly harsh de-
cisions is to restrict the grounds for recovery under a guest statute very
narrowly. The reasons most often propounded in support of guest statutes
are that they tend to prevent collusion and fraud between the guest and
host-operator in making unjust demands upon insurance companies,
2
and that they prevent frequent litigation between host and guest.
3 The
first reason has 6een criticized as being unjustified and without factual
support.' Even conceding that there have been cases of fraud and col-
lusion practiced upon the court in the attempt to fix liability under the
common law rule of ordinary negligence, it does not necessarily follow
that the enactment of statutes requiring a higher degree of negligence
will remedy these evils. One who would perjure himself to establish or-
dinary negligence would probably do the same thing in order to establish
a higher degree of negligence. The second reason advanced, ie., that
the statutes will prevent frequent litigation, is in fact merely a state-
ment of the operation of the statutes and not a reason for their existence.
The mere fact that the negligent operation of an automobile frequently
results in an injury to a gratuitous guest is logically no reason for
exempting the operator from liability. It is common knowledge, supported
by the large number of unnecessary accidents occuring daily, that the
automobile in the hands of many drivers is a dangerous instrumentality.
5
' Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. §6360-121 (1937).
2 Ward v. Jones, 195 Ark. 216, 112 S.W.2d 30 (1937); Woolf v. Holton, 224
S.W.2d 861 (Mo. 1949); Akins v. Hemphill, 207 P.2d 195 (Wash. 1949); Up-
church v. Hubbard, 29 Wash.2d 559, 188 P.2d (1947). See also 26 Calif. L.
Rev. 251 (1938); Appleman, Sleeping at the Wheel, 22 Iowa L. Rev. 525 (1937).
Cf. Stout v. Gallemore, 138 Khn. 385, 26 P.2d 573 (1933) (court indicated it is
too easy for guest to recover under the ordinary negligence rule).
a Woolf v. Holton, supra note 2. See Appleman, Sleping at the Wheel, 22 Iowa
L. Rev. 525 (1937); Hodges, The Automobile Guest Statutes, 12 Texas L. Rev.
303 (1934); Comment, 19 Ind. L.J. 145 (1944).
4 Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581 (1931) (dissenting opinion).
5 Tyndall v. Rippon, 61 Ai2d 422 (Del. Super. Ct. 1948)
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When not used with care, the automobile becomes a menace to person
and property, and it is frivolous to contend that exempting the negligent
driver from liability will further public policy and remedy this menace.
No such argument could justifiably be advanced when the injured party
is an innocent third person, such as a pedestrian or bystander. Never-
theless, the contention by the proponents of these statutes that the
operator of the vehicle, if insured, would be indifferent to a recovery by
the injured guest, would be equally applicable where the injured per-
son is simply a bystander. Why a different standard of care should be
applied in cases of innocent invitees and nct in the case of innocent third
parties is a question which remains unanswered.
It has been pointed out many times that the explanation for the pas-
sage of such statutes is to be found in the efforts of liability insurance
companies.? This would not be a reason for condemning these statutes
if they could be justifiedton the grounds of public policy and the modifi-
cation of liability had expressed itself in the form of reduced insurance
rates. Though it appears that no comprehensive survey of insurance
rates before and after the passage of such a statute has ever been made,
the observations of at least one writer indicated that no such reduction
has occurred.8 The reasons advanced for the passage of these statutes
are, as stated by a dissenting justice of the Michigan court in a case
turning on the Michigan statute, not founded nor justified by the facts
in or out of the record.9
A variety of terms are used in the various jurisdictions to limit the
liability of the host-operator under the guest statutes, but the terms most
frequently used to measure liability are "gross negligence" and "wilful
and wanton misconduct." The courts in construing their guest statutes
have defined "gross negligence" as: the failure to use slight care,10
no care at all,1 not necessarily a complete absence of care,1 2 complete
neglect of the safety of another, 3 synonymous with wilful and wanton
misconduct, 14 and not synonymous with wilful and wanton misconduct. 15
In defining "wilful and wanton misconduct," the courts have said it is:
something more than negligence,' 8 a-conscious indifference to the con-
6 Cases cited, supra note 2.
7 See 26 Calif. L. Rev. 251 (1938); Keegan, A Recent Development in Auto-
mobile Guest Statutes, 27 Geo. L.J. 624 (1939).
8 Keegan, A Recent Development in Automobile Guest Statutes, 27 Geo. L. J.
624 (1939).
9 Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581 (1931) (dissenting opinion).
10 Batchoff v. Craney, 119 Mont. 157, 172 P.2d 308 (1948).
11 Norgard v. Hoselton, 39 N.W.2d 427 (N.D. 1949).
12 Hennon v. Hardin, 78 Ga.App. 81, 50 S.E.2d 236 (1948).
-S Via v. Badanes, 189 Va. 44, 52 S.E.2d 174 (1949).
14 Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378, 25 So.2d 870 (1946); Thayer v. Thayer, 286
Mich. 273, 282 N.W. 145 (1938); Granflaten v. Rhode, 66 S.D. 335, 283 N.W.
153 (1938).
15 Cooper v. Calico, 218 S.W.2d 273 (Ark. 1949); Hennon v. Hardin, 78 Ga.
App. 81, 50 S.E.2d 236 (1948); Baatz v. Noble, 103 Mont. 59, 69 P.2d 579
(1937); James v. Krebeck, 141 Neb. 73, 2 N.W.2d 629 (1942).
4 Tithe v. Diamond, 149 Ohio St. 520, 80 N.E.2d 122 (1948); Elfert v. Witt,
38 N.W.2d 445 (S.D. 1949).
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sequences of one's acts,17 and express or implied knowledge that injury
will probably result,1 8 although actual intent to injure is not a neces-
sary element. 19 It is evident from these decisions, especially those defin-
ing gross negligence, that the courts in the various jurisdictions have
found very little in common in their statutory constructions. This is ex-
pressed in Tighe v. Dianwnd 20 in the following language: "... . because
of the careless use of language in court opinions and legal literature
describing these terms, great confusion has arisen in the matter of
applying them to specific cases."
A further illustration of this confusion may be found in the matter
of defense against a charge of wilful and wanton misconduct. It is the
generally accepted rule of tort law that one guilty of such misconduct
cannot claim either contributory negligence 21 or assumption of risk 22
as a defense. Several jurisdictions, however, have refused to apply these
rules to cases arising under the guest statute and have held that they
are valid defenses to such a charge.
2 3
At least one state, apparently recognizing the faulty reasoning and
discrepancies which have accompanied the acts, has repealed its guest
statute.2' Much confusion and hardship would be eliminated if this prece-
dent were generally followed. Now that compulsory liability insurance for
motorists has become entrenched in many jurisdictions there appears
even less reason why a guest should be excluded from protection. Cer-
tainly the insurance companies are better equipped to calculate and as-
sume the risk than the innocent guest.
AUTOMOBILES - VEHICLES KEPT FOR USE OF FAMILY - THE FAMILY
PuRPoSE DocTRiNE. In an action to recover damages from a father as
the result of a collision in which the father's car was being driven at
the time by an adult son, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held, that
the father was not liable. The court, although recognizing the family
purpose doctrine, refused to apply it because it was clearly shown by
the evidence that the son was not a member of the defendant's household
at the time of the accident. Bryan v. Schatz, 39 N.W.2d 435 (N.D. 1949).
The substance of the family purpose doctrine is that when the father
or other head of the family supplies an automobile for the use and
pleasure of the family, permitting the members thereof to use it at will,
17 Stephans v. Weigel, 336 Ill. App. 36, 82 N.E.2d 697 (1948); Kirsch v.
Harker, 89 N.E.2d 923 (Ind.App. 1950); Bailey v. Resner, 214 P.2d 323 (Kan.
1950).
I8 Cooper v.-Calico, 218 S.W.2d 723 (Ark. 1949); Allen v. Robinson, 85 Cal.
App. 2d 482, 193 P.2d 498 (1948); Tyndall v. Rippon, 61 Aid 422 (Del. Super.
(Ct. 1948); Helleren v. Dixon, 152 Ohio St. 40, 86 N.E.2d 777 (1949).
19 Tyndal v. Rippon, eupra note 18; Tighe v. Diamond, 149 Ohio St. 520, 80
N.E.2d 122 (1948).
20 149 Ohio St. 520, 80 N.E.2d 122, 126 (1948).
21 Prosser, Torts 402 (1941); 4 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and
Practice (Part 1) (539 (1946).
22 Prosser, Torts 383 (1941).
28 United Brotherhood v. Salter, 114 Colo. 513, 167 P.2d 954 (1946); Taylor
v. Taug, 17 Wash.2d 533, 136 P.2d 176 (1943).
24 Conn. Gen. Stat. §351d (Supp. 1937).
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the members thus using the automobile become agents of the head of
the family, and each one using it even for his sole personal pleasure,
i% carrying out the purpose for which the automobile is furnished. He is
the agent or servant of the head of the family so that the latter is liable
for injuries resulting from negligence in its operation., The doctrine is
a development from the rules applicable to the relation of master and
servant and principal and agent, which are extended to meet the new
situation brought about by the invention of the automobile and its
common use with the owner's permission by the members of his family
for whom he has provided it.2 The owner is held responsible because
only by doing so, as a general rule, can substantial justice be attained.8
The family purpose doctrine applies only where a child has not severed
his connection with the household of his father,4 and cannot be applied
where the child is no longer a member of the household. 5 It is immaterial
whether the child is an adult or a minor.6
The family purpose doctrine was introduced into North Dakota in
the case of Vannett v. Cole.7 The court there held that if a wife is using
her husband's car with his consent, for purpose of business or pleasure
of the family, he is liable, under the doctrine of respondeat superior for
her negligent operation. The doctrine was extended in Ulman v. Linde-
man 8 to cover a situation where a third person operated the owner's car
negligently if he was driving at the request of, or with the permission
of, the owner's wife and for a family purpose. Then in Miller v. Kraft 9
the court grafted an exception onto the doctrine when it held that even
though the father purchased a car for the general use of his family, if
he denied such use to a member of the family, he was not liable if such
member surreptitiously took the car and negligently injured another.
In Carpenter v.- Dunnell 1 the court held the father liable under the
family purpose doctrine for the negligent operation of the family car
by an adult son and declared the test to be, "not whether the son is an
adult or a minor, but whether he was using the car for a purpose for
which the parent provided it, with authority express or implied." 11
This test was reaffirmed in Harman v-Haas 12 where the father was held
liable for the negligent operation of his car by an adult daughter who
was living at home. But the doctrine was not applied by the court in
Posey v. Krogh,13 when the court held that an adult daughter was not
1 Norton v. Hall, 199 Ark. 428, 232 S.W. 934 (1921).
2 Mogle v. A. W. Scott Co., 144 Minn. 173, 174 N.W. 832 (1919).
3 King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S.W. 296 (1918).
4 Ibid.
5 Bryan v. Schatz, 39 N.W.2d 435 (N.D. 1949); Warren v. Norguard, 103
Wash. 284, 174 Pac. 7 (1918) ; Creaghead v. Hafle's Adm'r, 236 Ky. 250, 32 S.W.
2d 997 (1930).
6 Carpenter v. Dunnell, 61 N.D. 263, 237 N.W. 779 (1931).
7 41 N.D. 260, 170 N.W. 663 (1918).
8 44 N.D. 36, 176 N.W. 25 (1919).
9 57 N.D. 559, 223 N.W. 190 (1929).
10 61 N.D. 263, 237 N.W. 779 (1931).
11 Id. at 264, 237 N.W. at 780.
12 61 N.D. 772, 241 N.W. 70 (1932).
13 65 N.D. 490, 259 N.W. 757 (1935).
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liable for the negligent use of her car by her brother while on the busi-
ness of her father even though she allowed the members of the family
to use the car when she was not using it, because she was not the head
of the family. The court in the instant case,1'4 although recognizing the
doctrine, held that it did not apply under the facts presented.
The family purpose doctrine has been held to cover a situation where
the owner's automobile was negligently operated by a third person and
under the direction of the owner's wife.15 A mother owning and main-
taining a automobile for the general use, pleasurq and convenience of
the members of the family may be subjected to liability under the doc-
trine.' 6 A grandfather was held liable under the doctrine for the negli-
gent operation of his car by his grandson where the facts established
that the grandson lived with his grandparents.17 The doctrine has also
been held to apply so as to embrace persons living in one household and
under one head and government.' 8
The doctrine has been held not to apply where the child took the car
without the authority or consent of the head of the family,19 and the
fact that other members of the family are in the automobile at the time
of the dccident will not change this rule.20 However, consent need not
be expressed, but can be implied from the conduct of the parties.21 Circum-
stances may show implied consent even though the parent has given
express orders that the child was not to operate his car.
22
In some jurisdictions, including North Dakota,2 the operation of a
car by a member of the family establishes a presumption that the
vehicle was being operated for the owner, 2' but this presumption is re-
buttable.' 5 Whethr or not the family purpose doctrine applies depends
upon the evidence in each case. 26 One of the indispensable requisites of
the doctrine is that the person upon whom one seeks to fasten liability,
owns, maintains, or provides an automobile for the general use, pleasure,
and convenience of the family. 27
14 Bryan v. Schatz, 39 N.W. 2d 435 (N.D. 1949).
15 Ulman v. Lindeman, 44 N.D. 36, 176 N.W. 25 (1919).
26 See United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Hall, 237 Ky. 393, 35 S.W.
2d 550, 551 (1931).
17 McGee v. Crawford, 205 N.C. 318, 171 S.E. 326 (1933).
18 Smart v. Bissonette, 106 Conn. 447, 138 Atl. 365 (1927) (Where a house-
keeper for a Catholic priest was held to be within the doctrine).
19 Sultzbach v. Smith, 174 Iowa 704, 156 N.W. 673 (1916); Miller v. Kraft,
57 N.D. 559, 223 N.W. 190 (1929); Hager v. Lenzi, 152 Wash. 611, 278 Pac.
673 (1929).
20 Kohlmeier v. Allen, 201 App. Div. 445, 194 N.Y.Supp. 597 (1922).
21 Napier v. Patterson, 198 Iowa 257, 196 N.W. 73 (1923); Grier y. Wood-
side, 200 N.C. -759, 158 S.E. 491 (1931).
22 Wallace v. Squires, 186 N.C. 339, 119 S.E. 569 (1923).
2"See La Bree v. Dakota Tractor & Equipment Co., 69 N.D. 561, 288 N.W.
476 (1939).
24 Lange v. Bedell, 203 Iowa 1194, 212 N.W. 354 (1927); Birch v. Abercrombie,
74 Wash. 486, 138 Pac. 1020 (1913).
25 Carlson v. Hoff, 59 N.D. 393, 230 N.W. 294 (1930).
'5 McCaughey v. Smiddy, 109 Conn. 417, 146 Atl. 822 (1929).
27 Williams v. Rubenstein, 69 F. 2d. 231 (1934) ; Maher v. Fahy, 122 Conn. 76,
151 Atl. 318 (1930); Euster v. Vogel, 227 Ky. 785, 13 S.W. 2d. 1028* (1929);
Green v. Smith, 153 Va. 675, 151 S.E. 282'(1930); Birch v. Abercrombie, 74
Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020 (1913).
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Since it must be shown that at the time of the accident the auto-
mobile was being used for a family purpose,28 liability was not imposed
upon the father where the son used his father's car to go into another
state to get married, 29 where a daughter permitted a fraternity mem-
ber to use the family automobile for the benefit of the fraternity mem-
bers,30 or where a son used his father's car while working as a salesman
for a company.3' On the other hand the doctrine was applied where the
car was used for the purpose of going to a ball game,32 and it has also
been applied where the family car was used to go to a dance. 33 In a lead-
ing Minnesota case the court refused to extend the doctrine so as to cover
a motorboat.3 4 Other courts have refused to extend the doctrine to a
motorcycle,3 5 or a bicycle.
36
The family purpose doctrine has been rejected in many jurisdictions.37
The courts which reject the doctrine do so on the ground that it has no
firm foundation in reason or common sense,88 that it is beyond the
recognition of sound principles of law as applied to the agency relation-
ship, 89 and it is contrary to common sense to say that when a member
of a family uses the family car for his own pleasure he is accomplishing
his father's business.40 The doctrine has been referred to as a glaring
example of judicial legislation. 41 '
The rules of agency should not be varied in response to the supposed
exigencies of some particular situation.42 The rule has long been es-
tablished that the mere relationship of parent and child will not make
28 Schnebly v. Bryson, 158 Wash. 250, 290 Pac. 849 (1930).
29 Payne v. Leininger, 160 Minn. 75, 199 N.W. 435 (1924).
30 Schnebly v. Bryson, 158 Wash. 250, 290 Pac. 849 (1930).
31 Scates v Sandefer, 163 Tenn. 558, 44 S.W. 2d. 310 (1931).
32 Winn v. Haliday, 109 Miss. 691, 69 So. 685 (1915).
33 Lewis v. Steele, 52 Mont. 300, 157 Pac. 575 (1916).
34 Felcyn v. Gamble, 185 Minn. 357, 241 N.W. 37 (1932) (The court stated that
the family purpose doctrine is applicable to automobiles only. It was applied
to automobiles in the interest of justice and as a necessity. The situation as
regards motorboats is in no way comparable to that of automobiles). See 6 So.
Calif. L. Rev. 340 (1933) for a discussion of the principles involved in this case.
35 Meinhardt v. Vaughn, 15 Tenn. 272, 17 S.W.2d 5 (1929) (See 16 Minn. L.
Rev. 870, 871 (1932) for a discussion on how this case has been erroneously
cited as applying the family purpose doctrine - case was in reality decided on
a strict agency relation); Hopkins v. Droppers, 184 Wis. 400, 198 N.W. 738
(1924).
36 Pflugmacher v. Thomas, 209 P. 2d. 443 (Wash. 1949) (The court stated,
"We are not convinced . . . that the use of a bicycle . . . requires or would
justify . . . extending and applying the family purpose doctrine . . . ").
37Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N.Y. 111, 115 N.E. 443 (1917); Hays v.
Hogan, 273 Mo. 1, 200 S.W. 286 (1917); Behseleck v. Andrus 60 S.D. 204, 244
N.W. 268 (1932); Trice v. Bridgewater, 125 Tex. 75, 81 S.W. 2d. 63 -(1935);
Gordon v. Rose, 54 Idaho 502, 33 P.2d 351 (1934); Watkins v. Clark, 103 Kan.
629, 176 Pac. 131 (1918); Parker v. Wilson, 179 Ala. 361, 60 So. 150 (1912);
Doran v. Thomsen, 76 NJ.L. 754, 71 Atl. 296 (1908)..
38 Hays v. Hogan, 273 Mo. 1, 200 S.W. 286 (1917); Doran v. Thomsen, 76
N.J.L. 754, 71 Atl. 296 (1908).
89 Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N.Y. 111, 115 N.E. 443 (1917).
40 Watkins v. Clark, 103 Kan. 629, 176 Pac. 131 (1918).
41 See 20 I1. L. Rev. 312, 313 (1925).
42 Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N.Y. 111, 115 N.E. 443 (1917).
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the former liable for the torts of the later,"3 and the only argument
which justifies the courts in applying the family purpose doctrine is
one of policy."' If the doctrine serves a useful purpose in that it places
the financial responsibility oi the head of the family, 45 it would seem
proper for the legislatures to determine this policy rather than the
courts by distorting basic principles of agency and torts."
e
BANKRUPTCY - CooPERATrEs - AMENABILITY TO INVOLUNTARY BANK-
RUPTCY PROC EDINGS. A petition in involuntary bankruptcy was filed
against the defendant, a cooperative corporation organized as a benevo-
lent association under the laws of Arkansas for the purpose of rehabili-
tating and rendering self-supporting the families of its members, tenant
farmers and sharecroppers of low income. Under its charter the co-
operative had very broad powers to carry on any "dairy, mercantile,
mining, manufacturing or mechanical business; to acquire or ... dispose
of.. . farms, pasturages, homesteads, community and cooperative enter-
prises or activities of any kind." The actual operations of the defendant
consisted principally of leasing farm lands with money obtained from
the government and reletting the land to its members. The cooperative
was closely supervised by the Department of Agriculture, which placed
three of its employees on the association's five-man board of directors.
From the outset it was insolvent. An answer was filed to the petition
denying that the cooperative was subject to involuntary proceedings
as a "moneyed, bu~siness, or commercial" corporation under §4 (b) of the
-Bankruptcy Act.' It was held, that since the corporation was clearly in-
tended to operate for the financial benefit of its members it was a
"moneyed, business, or commercial" corporation within the intendment
of the Bankruptcy Act, and adjudication as a bankrupt was granted.
In re Misssc Homeatead Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 511 (E.D.Ark. 1949).
48 Mechem, Agency, §156 (2d ed. 1914); Clarine v. Addison, 182 Minn. 310,
234 N.W. 295 (1931). This rule is adopted by statute in North Dakota, N.D. Rev.
Code 114-0921 (1943).
44 Gordon v. Rose, 54 Idaho 502, 33 P. 2d. 351 (1934); King v. Smythe, 140
Tenn. 217, 204 S.W. 296 (1918).
45 King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S.W. 296 (1918).
4s Gordon v. Rose, 54 Idaho 502, 33 P. 2d. 351 (1934); Trice v. Bridgewater,
125 Tex. 75, 81 S.W. 2d. 63 (1935); Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N.Y. 111, 115
N.E. 443 (1917). No state has directly adopted the family purpose doctrine
by statute. However, Connecticut has a statute which raises a presumption that
a motor vehicle is being operated as a family car when the operator is a husband,
wife, father, -mother, son or daughter. Conn. Gen. Stat. Cum. Supp. 1600A
(1931). Idaho on the other hand has held that 149-1003, Idaho Code (1948) shows
the legislative intent not to adopt the family purpose doctrine. This statute
limits the father's liability for the negligent operation of the family car by a
child to situations where the child is under 16 years of age. Gordon v. Rose, 54
Idaho 502, 33 P.2d 351 (1934).
1 "Any natural person, except a wage earner or farmer, and any moneyed,
business, or commercial corporation, except a building and loan association, a
municipal, railroad, insurance, or banking corporation .. . may be adjudged
an involuntary bankrupt." Bankruptcy Act 14 (b). 36 Stat. 839 (1910), 11 U.S.C.
§22 (1940).
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Federal courts which have considered the question of whether coopera-
tive corporations may be adjudicated involuntary bankrupts have reached
differing conclusions. 2 Two early cases adopted the view that farmers
cooperative marketing associations are essentially non-profit organiza-
tions excluded from the scope of the involuntary provisions of the Bank-
rupt Act.3 A series of more recent decisions has seen a different result
reached, broadly in accord with the principle of the instant case.4 The
latter cases, however, have adopted differing criteria for determining
whether or not a corporation is "moneyed, business, or commercial."
One test used by the courts has been whether the corporation is organized
for pecuniary gain.5 On the other hand, it has been held that the amen-
ability of a corporation to involuntary proceedings is determined by the
character of its activities, and that corporations are subject to the Act
if their operations are primarily commercial in nature, whether or not
pecuniary gain for the corporation is the ultimate object.e As applied
to cooperative corporations, the latter test appears more logical since
it avoids the difficulty raised by the fact that true cooperatives, strictly
speaking, make no profit for themselves but only for the members and
patrons.7 The cases which have held cooperatives immune from involun-
tary proceedings appear to have taken the position that the nonprofit
character of cooperative marketing associations, combined with the
public interest subserved by the promotion of efficient marketing prac-
tices, places cooperatives outside the class of business institutions. 8 This
viewpoint finds a good deal of support.9 Mr. Justice Brandeis has stated
2 Hulbert, Legal Phases of Cooperative Associations 111-12 (FCA Bulletin
50, 1942).
3 In re Weeks Poultry Community, 51 F.2d 122 (S.D. Cal. 1931); In re Dairy
Marketing Ass'n of Ft. Wayne, 8 F.2d 626 (D.Ind. 1925), 74 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 408
(1926).
4 In re Wisconsin Cooperative Milk Pool, 119 F.2d 999 (7th Cir.), dert. denied
sub nom., 314 U.S. 655 (1941), reversing, 35 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Wis. 1940), 39
Mich.L. Rev. 1011 (1941); In re South Shore Cooperative Ass'n, 4 F, Supp. 772
(W.D.N.Y. 1933); Schuster v. Ohio Farmers Cooperative Milk Ass'n, 61 F.2d
337 (6th Cir. 1932), 46 Harv. L. Rev. 326, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 982 (1933).
5 In re Wisconsin Cooperative Milk 'Pool, supra note 4; Schuster v. Ohio
Farmers Cooperative Milk Ass'n, aupra note 4; In re' Deauville, 52 F.2d 963
(D.Nev. 1931); In re Elmsford Country Club, 50 F.2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1931);
In re R. L. Radke Co., 193 Fed. 735 (N.D.Cal. 1911); 46 Harv. L. Rev. 326
(1932); 74 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 408 (1926).
6 In re South Shore Cooperative Ass'n, 4 F.Supp. 772 (W.D.N.Y. 1933). Cf.
In re Michigan Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 20 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Mich.
1937); Roumanian Workers Educational Ass'n of America v. Popovich, 108
F.2d 782 (6th Cir. 1940). See Nadler, Law of Bankruptcy §391 (1948).
7See Farmers Union Co-op. Co. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 488, 491 (8th Cir.
1937); Packel, Cooperatives and the Income Tax, 90 U.ofPa.L.Rev. 137 (1941).
Cf. Board of Underwriters of City of Duluth v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 860
(1932). See 10 Wis. L. Rev. 516 (1935).
s In re Wisconsin Cooperative Milk Pool, 35 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Wis. 1940),
39 Mich. L. Rev. 1011 (1941); In re Dairy Marketing Ass'n of Ft. Wayne, 8
F.2d 626 (D.Ind.) 1925), 74 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 408 (1926).
e See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Frost v. Corporation
Commission of Oklahoma, 278 U.S. 515, 536-48 (1929). Cf. Liberty Warehouse Co.
v. Burley Tobacco Growers Cooperative Marketing Ass'n, 276 U.S. 71 (1929);
Manchester Dairy System v. Hayward, 82 N.H. 193, 132 AtI. 12 (1926); North-
ern Wisconsin Cooperative Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal, 182 Wis. 571, 197 N.W.
936 (1924). See Comment, 40 Yale L.J. 282 (1930).
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that both stock and non-stock cooperatives differ vitally from commercial
corporations, citing what he referred to as the "economic democracy"
practiced by cooperative associations.'0 And a clear distinction between
cooperatives and ordinary business corporations has been drawn by
congress in exempting cooperatives, together with fraternal, religious,
and charitable institutions, from the payment of income taxes." It has
been declared the public policy of congress to encourage the growth of
cooperative marketing in order to promote the effective merchandising
of agricultural commodities.1 2 A satisfactory rationalization of the
seeming inconsistency apparent in the congressional policy of classifying
cooperatives with organizations of an eleemosynary nature for tax pur-
poses, and the judicial policy of classifying them as ordinary business
corporations for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction in bankruptcy, has
not yet been made by the courts. The congressional policy, however, has
been cited in support of the view that cooperatives are not "moneyed,
business, or commercial" corporations. 13 It has been held in cases deal-
ing with fraternal benefit societies that the question of whether involun-
tary proceedings in bankruptcy may be brought against a corporation
should be determined by the classification in which the corporation is
placed by state law." If this rule were applied to the case of cooperatives,
it is probable that the bulk of cooperative associations would be exempt
from involuntary proceedings, since most state statutes classify them as
nonprofit organizations. 1 5 However, it is probable that the state classi-
fication rule would not be sustained by the United States Supreme
Court, which has declared that in the interpretation -and application of
the Bankruptcy Act, federal and not local law applies, 16 and that the
rule of Erie Ry. v. Tompkins 17 is not controlling in this regard. 18 More-
over, no case has ever applied the state classification rule to cooperatives.
10 Frost v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, supra note 9, at 536. See
Doss v. Farmers Union, 173 Okla. 70, 71, 46 P.2d 950, 951 (1935). A far less
enchanted attitude toward cooperatives has been exhibited by those courts
which have held them amenable to involuntary proceedings. "There is nothing
broadly eleemosynary in cooperative associations," said the court in Schuster
v. Consumers Co-op Milk Ass'n, 61 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1932), 46 Harv. L. Rev. 326
31 Mich. L. Rev. 982 (1933). "They simply represent a banding together of
producers for their common good, and the motive of each is pecuniary gain."
And even Mr. Justice Brandeis, referring to the designation of cooperative as-
sociations as "non-profit," said, ". . . the term is merely one of art, indicating
the manner in which the financial advantage is distributed." Frost v. Corpora-
tion Commission, supra note 9, at 537.
1152 Stat. 480 (1938), 26 U.S.C. §101(10), (12) (1940).
1246 Stat. 11, 12 U.S.C. 11141 (3) (1940).
is See In re Wisconsin Cooperative Milk Pool, 35 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Wis.
1940), 39 Mich. L. Rev. 1011 (1941); In re Dairy Marketing Ass'n of Ft. Wayne,
8 F.2d 626 (D.Ind. 1925), 74 U.ofPa.L.Rev. 408 (1926).
"4 Hoile v. Unity Life Ins. Co., 136 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1943); In re Supreme
Lodge of the Masons Annuity, 286 Fed. 180 (N.D. Ga. 1923); In re Grand Lodge
A.O.U.W., 232 Fed. 199 (N.D. Cal. 1916). But cf. In re Order of Sparta, 242
Fed. 235 (3d Cir. 1917).
15 See Note, 148 A.L.R. 714 (1944).
is Wragg v. Fed. Land Bank, 817 U.S. 325, 328 (1943). See Prudence Realiza-
tion Co. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89, 95 (1942).
17 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
is Prudence Realization Co. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89, 95 (1942).
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This appears to lend force to the statement of one commentator that the
state classification rule rests on weaker ground when applied to coopera-
tives than when applied to other types of business organizations. 19 In the
instant case, therefore, the court seems correct in concluding that the
fact that the defendant was organized as a benevolent association 20
under Arkansas law did not compel a judgment for the defendant.
The importance of a correct determination of the issue found in the
instant case is illustrated by the fact that the question is jurisdictional
and a motion to set aside adjudication as a bankrupt on the ground that
a corporation is outside the scope of the Act may be made after the time
for appeal has expired. 21 Moreover, it is a well recognized rule in bank-
ruptcy that the Act is to be construed strictly with regard to the classes
6f corporations subject to involuntary proceedings. 22 In this respect, it
would appear that a broad distinction can be drawn between the ordi-
nary cooperative and an organization of the type involved in the instant
case. A consideration of the identical class of cooperative association was
made in Farm Security Administration v. Herren,23 a case which -
significantly - involved the question of whether this type of cooperative
was not actually a branch of the Federal Government itself. It was
stated in that case that a large number of such cooperatives were or-
ganized by the Department of Agriculture between 1930 and 1940 as
a means of relieving the economic consequence of the agricultural de-
pression which prevailed prior to the last war. It would seem that such
activities may properly be characterized as benevolent and charitable,
and not commercial. Farm Security Administration v. Herren held that
such cooperatives were not agencies of the government, a decision fol-
lowed in the instant case. The general rule already referred to, that co-
operatives engaged in primarily commercial enterprises are subject to
involuntary proceedings, seems to be so definitely established by the
majority of cases that it is doubtful whether it should now be overturned.
But that a cooperative of this type is not an ordinary business enter-
prise seems clear. The true explanation of the instant case appears to
lie in the fact that an equitable distribution of the cooperative's assets
could more readily be obtained by ineans of bankruptcy procedures.
2 '
19 See Note, 148 A.L.R. 714, 720-22 (1944).
20 See §§2252-2261, Ark. Stat. (Pope Digest, 1937).
21 Roumanian Workers Educational Ass'n of America v. Popovich, 108 F.2d
782 (6th Cir. 1940).
22 In re Dairy Marketing Ass'n of Ft. Wayne, 8 F.2d 626 (D. Ind. 1925), 74
U. of Pa.L.Rev. 408 (1926); In re New York and New Jersey Ice Lines, 147 Fed.
214 (2d Cir. 1906).
23 165 F.2d 554 (8th Cir. 1948).
24 "It would seem that the courts are greatly influenced by the effect of the
filing of the involuntary petition in bankruptcy, and where an adjudication
would serve to carry out the fundamental purposes of bankruptcy to see that
assets of an insolvent be divided ratably among creditors and to make it possible
to challenge and set aside preferential and/or fraudulent conveyances, the courts
are able to construe the language .of this provision of the Act to justify and
sustain such an involuntary petition on the basis of public policy." Nadler,
Law of Bankruptcy §391 (1948). The opinion in the present case mentioned
large payments to creditors of the cooperative which were alleged to be pre-
ferential.
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CONFLICTS OF LAWS - JURISDICTION - DIVERSITY JURISDICTION OF
FEDERAL COURTS. Mississippi has a statute which provides that any
foreign corporation failing t6 qualify to do business in the state shall
not be permitted to bring any action in the courts of the state. The
plaintiff, a realty company, sued the defendant, a resident of Mississippi,
in a federal district court in Mississippi to recover commissions on the
sale of real estate located in Mississippi. The cour found that the con-
tract was void under Mississippi law, since the realty company was not
qualified to do business in the state, and dismissed the complaint. The
Court of Appeals reversed, 168 F.2d 701, reversal affd on rehearing,
170 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1948), on the ground that the statute simply
barred the remedy in the Mississippi courts and did not apply to suits
brought in federal courts. On writ of certiorari to the United States Su-
preme Court it was held, that the decision of the Circuit Court be re-
versed. A federal court for purposes of diversity jurisdiction is in effect
only another court of the state in which it sits, and a right which local
law creates, but for which it does not supply a remedy, is no right at
all for purposes of enforcement in a federal court sitting in diversity
cases. Woods v. Inter-State Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
In David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club of America,' decided
in 1912, a contrary result was reached in a fact situation similar to that
in the instant case. However, subsequent decisions have referred to the
Lupton's case as "obsolete" 2 in the light of Erie Ry. v. Tompkins,3 and
the present decision clearly demonstrates its invalidity. It must now be
considered overruled. The instant decision appears an expansion of the
doctrine of Erie Ry. v. Tompkins which no doubt goes far beyond the
expectations of Mr. Justice Brandeis when he delivered the decision in
1938 and thereby overruled the long standing doctrine of Swift v. Tyson.,
In the Erie Ry. case it was held that the federal courts in diversity cases
were not free to follow a "federal common law," but must follow state
decisions as well as state statutes. Under this mandate, the federal courts
sitting in a state for diversity purposes are bound by the substantive law
of the state while presumably not so bound by its procedural law. In
subsequent cases the doctrine has been extended to include state rules as
to burden of proof,5 conflicts of law,e decisions of intermediate courts of a
state where the point has not been passed on by the highest court of the
state,' state rulings on the statutes of limitations,s and in addition has
firmly bound the equity side of the court to the doctrine.9 In Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York,' 0 the court held that federal courts cannot afford re-
covery if the right to recover is unavailable in state courts, and that
225 U.S. 489 (1912).
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
s304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4 16 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1842).
5 Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939).
e Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S.
498 (1941).
7 West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 311' U.S. 223 (1 3); Stoner
v. New York Life Ins. Co.,.311 U.S. 464 (1940).
8 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
9 Ibid.
20 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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regardless of whether a state statute is characterized as substantive or
procedural, if it vitally affects the outcome of a diversity case it is bind-
ing on the lower courts.
The majority opinion in the much discussed case of Angel v. Bulling-
ton,1 which next followed the Guaranty case, unfortunately was not clear
in its holding, as is evidenced by the fact that even the dissenting
opinions were unable to decide the true basis of the majority holding.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina had upheld the constitutionality
of an anti-deficiency judgment act of that state in a suit brought by
Bullington, a citizen of Virginia, against Angel, a citizen of North Caro-
lina, denying the jurisdiction of North Carolina courts to entertain such
a suit.12 Bullington then brought a new suit in a federal court in North
'Carolina, and on appeal to the Supreme Court the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to entertain the suit was also denied, on the ground that
under the Erie Ry. doctrine, closing the doors of the state courts also
closed the doors of the federal courts, and also upon the ground that the
decision of the North Carolina court was res judicata so as to bar a new
suit in the federal court. As a result of the failure of the court to specify
the grounds of its holding clearly, it is difficult to ascertain how far
the court's decision relied upon the Erie Ry. doctrine. 13 At first glance,
there is an apparent inconsistency in the case. The Supreme Court of
North Carolina had held the North Carolina statute to be procedural,
while the Supreme Court of the United States diregarded this ruling and
decided for itself that the statute was substantive so as to be binding
upon the federal courts. However, when this holding is considered in the
light of the Guaranty case, it becomes obvious that the classification of
substantive and procedural law found in the Erie Ry. doctrine is not
absolute. The present state of the law is clearly that any state law
which would affect the outcome of a case is given the effect of sub-
stantive law regardless of its formal classification.
Much criticism may be found of the extension of the Erie Ry. rule to
include situations like that presented by the instant case.14 This criticism
is based mainly upon two grounds: (1) that it goes beyond the intent
of the original decision in Erie Ry' v. Tompkins, and (2) that it takes
away the freedom of congress and the federal courts to decide their own
procedural law in diversity cases and places it within the control of the
state. The first criticism may be answered by pointing out that the over-
all purpose of Erie Ry. v. Tompkins was to discourage litigants from
shopping for a forum and to insure like results from like sets of facts
in both the state and federal courts in diversity cases. The second
criticism fails to consider the fact that the merits of allowing congress
and the federal courts to determine their own law are not as great as
the merits in favor of removing discrimination and forum shopping
11 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
12 Angel v. Bullington, 220 N.C. 18, 16 S.E.2d 411 (1946).
is A number of commentators have raised this point. See, e.g., Farinholt,
Angel v4 Bullington: Twilight of Diversity Jurisdiction?, 26 N.C.L. Rev. 29
(1947); Comment, 12 Mo. L. Rev. 333 (1947); 60 Harv. L. Rev. 822 (1947).
14 See the dissenting opinions in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra; Woods
v. Interstate Realty Co., supra; and Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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from diversity cases. The court's holding in the instant case is not un-
reasonable in view of the purpose federal courts were intended to serve
in diversity cases, which was to complement state courts by assisting
out of state citizens to receive a fair hearing and not to set up a new
and different tribunal.
DIvoRcE - ALIMONY - EFFECT OF WiFE's REMARRIAGE. In a suit for
divorce by W against H, W obtained a decree and an award of alimony.
Thereafter W remarried and H discontinued payments of alimony. The
second marriage being subsequently annulled, W requested H to resume
payments as required by the decree. Later, when H moved to modify the
divorce judgment and decree by striking therefrom the provision for
alimony on the ground that W's remarriage had terminated his obliga-
tion in this respect, the court held, that the marriage of a divorced wife
does not ipso facto cancel the obligation to pay the installments of ali-
mony awarded by the decree, but is merely evidence of a change in condi-
tion which may motivate the court in revising the decree upon proper
application. Motion denied. Boiteau v. Boiteau, 227 Minn. 26, 33 N.W.2d
703 (1948).
North Dakota has no case or statute on the point. The majority of the
courts hold that the remarriage of a divorced wife does not automatically
terminate the former husband's obligation to pay the alimony decreed,
although it affords a cogent reason for a court to modify or vacate the
order in its discretion.' In Dietrick v. Dierick,2 the court said that should
the wife remarry one who could not support her in the style to which she
was accustomed it appeared to be the wiser course to require the former
husband to continue to provide for her support. And in another New
Jersey case the court went so far as to say that even if the second hus-
band is able to support her but does not do so because of his conduct and
habits, the divorced husband is obligated to continue his payments for
her support.3 A very small minority of cases express the view that ali-
mony ceases unconditionally upon the wife's remarriage.' The husband's
duty toward his wife is to support her while she remains single, and if
she remarries the duty terminates. 5 Good public policy does not compel
a divorced husband to support his former wife after she has become
another man's wife except under extraordinary circumstances which she
should be required to prove.6 It is difficult to suggest or conceive any
cause that would present grounds more "reasonable and proper" for
suspending further paysfient of alimony than the subsequent marriage
of the divorced wife. 7 It is her privilege to abandon the provision made
I Cohen v. Cohen, 150 Cal. 99, 88 Pac. 267 (1906); McHan v. McHan, 59 Idaho
496, 84 P.2d 984 (1938); McGill v. McGill, 101 Kan. 324, 166 Paec. 501 (1917).
2 99 NJ.Eq. 711, 134 Atl. 338 (1926).
a Cropsey v. Cropsey, 104 NJ.Eq. 187, 144 Atl. 621 (1929).
4 Knabe v. Knabe, 176 Md. 606, 6 A.2d 366 (1939); Hood v. Hood, 138 Md.
355, 113 Atl. 895 (1921).
5 Tremper v. Tremper, 89 Cal. App. 62, 177 Pac. 868 (1918).
6 Cohen v. Cohen, 150 Cal. 99, 88 Pac. 267 (1906).
7 Stillman v. Stillman, 99 Ill. 196 (1881).
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by decree of the court for her support under sanctions of the law for the
maintenance which she will obtain by a second marriage.8 From the
voluntary action of the wife in remarrying, the inference arises that
she has elected to obtain her support from her second husband and has
thereby abandoned the provision made for her support by the court in
its award of alimony.9 The law will require her to abide by her election
since there is no reason why she should not do so. 10 Whether she acts
wisely in her election, or whether in every instance she obtains as good
or as adequate support by her remarriage as that which she abandoned
are questions about which courts can ha e no concern.'1 The foregoing
statements paraphrase the reasoning of the various courts which ter-
minated alimony upon remarriage of the divorced wife, but only through
court action.
A North Dakota statute provides for alimony for the divorced party
and for modification of alimony from time to time.1 2 In construing this
statute, there seems to be no reason why the court could not hold that re-
marriage of a divorced wife automatically terminates alimony payments
from the time of the remarriage of the wife. But should the court con-
sider an automatic termination of the alimony decree by the mere act of
the wife's remarrying as an infringement on the court's power, the same
result could be reached by holding that alimony terminates absolutely
as of the time of the wife's remarriage, upon proper application to the
court.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - ToRTs - INFANT'S RIGHT To SUE FOR THE
ENTICING AWAY OF A PARENT. The plaintiff, a minor, sued to recover
damages alleged to have been sustained when the defendant enticed the
plaintiff's' mother away from the family home. The court held that the
child has legally protected rights in the maintenance of the family as a
unit against interference by outsiders and that enticement by one outside
the family is a violation of the child's rights for which a tort action
for damages may be maintained. Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37
N.W.2d 543 (1949).
The principle on which this action proceeded was first enunciated in
Daily v. Parker., The courts have not unanimously accepted the theory
of the Daily case, with the result that there is a split of authority on the
basic question of whether the child has a cause of action at all, and if so
on what theory recovery should be allowed. In the principal case, allow-
ing the child a cause of action, the court reasoned that a deliberate in-
terference with a relationship from which legally unenforceable bene-
fits flow to a person is actionable, using as examples, that of an employee
8 White v. Murden, 190 Ga. 536, 9 S.E.2d 745 (1940).
9 Cary v. Cary, 112 Conn. 261, 152 Atl. 302 (1930).
10 White v. Murden, 190 Ga. 536, 9' S.E.2d 745 (1940).
11 Stillman v. Stillman 99 Ill. 196 (1881).
12 N.D. Rev. Code §14-0524 (1943).
1 Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945), 59 Harv. L. Rev. 297 (1945).
Contra: Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N.Y.Supp. 912 (1934); But
cf. Cole v. Cole, 227 Mass. 50, 177 N.E. 810 (1931).
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to obtain reemployment from his former employer when the interference
causes loss of employment; 2 ,that of a person engaged in business to ob-
tain trade from the public where the interference causes the tradesman
loss of expected trade; 8 and that right of a person to enjoy expected
social intercourse where the interference causes its loss. 4
Arguments denying the child a right of action for the alienation of
the parent's affection stress the possibility of excessive litigation. 5 The
injured spouse may bring alienation of affections, and that everyone
"whose cheek was tinged by the blush of shame" should also be allowed
to bring an action is the fear of the courts. A joinder of the rights of
action tried on their merits is the suggested solution to this possibility.6
A common defense to granting the cause of action is that there is no
precedent, 7 this argument being rooted in a very narrow interpretation
of the doctrine of consortium and the fact that before the Daily case
there was a true lack of precedent for the action.
The argument that allowing the action in the child would disrupt the
family unity and the father's authority is groundless. The, suit is not
against the parent, but a stranger to the family unit - the enticer.
Domestic harmony has usually already been broken before the suit is
brought and the deep family ties which have survived will not be en-
dangered by the suit.8 Nor is the mere fact that damages will be ex-
tremely difficult to determine, a just reason for denying the cause of
action.9 Other cases denying a cause of action use similar arguments.' 0
The strongest attack against allowing the infant a cause of action is
based on the narrow concept of consortium as the exclusive interest in the
affections between' the husband and wife."' Whether or not the doctrine
of consortium should be expanded to include the child's interest in the
parent's affections is the real sociological issue which is being currently
decided in the courts.
12
The Dai1/ case recognized the child's right of action and held that
the child may maintain an action against a woman who enticed the
2Joyce v. Great Northern Ry., 100 Minn. 225, 110 N.W. 975 (1907) (right
created by statute).
8 Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909).
'Deon v. Kirby Lumber Co., 162 La. 671, 111 So. 55 (1926).
5 Morrow v.Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N.Y.Supp. 912 (1934).
6 Note, 41 I1. L. Rev. 444, 450 n.47 (1946).
7 MeMillan v. Taylor, 160 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Miller v. Monsen, 228
Minn. 400, 37 N.W. 2d 543 (1949).
8 Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E.2d 254 (1939); Note, 59 Harv. L. Rev.
297 (1945).
9 Note, 20- Cornell L.Q. 255 (1935) (a succinct argument in favor of the
action).
lOGarza v. Garza, 209 S.W. 2d 1012 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); McMillan v.
Taylor, 160 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (lack of precedent used as a defense);
Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N.Y. Supp. 912 (1934) (no loss of
consortium and possibility of excessive litigation argued); Rudley v. Tobias,
84 Cal. Appi 2d 454, 190 P.2d 984 (1948) (Cal. Civ. Code 1§43, 43.5, 49 omitted
previous prohibition of abduction of parent from child as constituting a cause of
action); Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 56 A2d 768 (1947) (consortium should
not be enlarged to include the child's interest in the family).
"1 See note -10 supra.
12 See Note, 162 A.L.R. 824 (1946).
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father away from home; that damages may be had not only for the
loss of the father's support and maintenance, but also for injuries to
feelings, the loss of the child's right to comfort, protection, and society
of the father.' 3 Here the "totality of the family rights and duties" was
given legal sanction so as to be the basis for the child's action. A sub-
sequent Illinois decision granting a cause of action reasoned that the
child has two distinct rights in the family relationship: the right to
financial support and the right to recovery for an injury to feelings for
the deprivation of a father's comfort, protection, and society.1 4
Heke the family rights were construed to be reciprocal. 15 A recent
federal decision in expanding the right of action, reasoned that the
family is a cooperative group in which each member has reciprocal
rights and duties, two rights of the child being recognized: one to the
tangibles of food, clothing, and shelter; the other to the intangibles of
affection, companionship, moral support, and guidance from both
parents. 16
Granting the child a cause of action and justifying the revolt against
precedent as the proper exercise of judicial empiricism,17 the courts
today acknowledge the breakdown of consortium into tangible and in-
tangible rights; Is thereby expanding the doctrine to include the child's
interest in the family based on expected support, an interest in the se-
curity of the household, and a right to the society and affections of the
parents.' 9 The general statement that the law has done little to protect
the rights of the child 20 is no longer true as the trend today is toward
a recognition of the parental duty to support as being a legal one 21
a cause of action lying against one inducing a breach of this right.
22
Courts unwilling to tamper with the limited common law view of con-
sortium may grant the cause of action by reasoning that for every
wrong there is a remedy, 23 the wrong being a breach of the parental
duty of support.2 4 Although there is no decision on the question, it is
's Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945).
"4 Johnson v. Luhman, 330 I1. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947).
15 Note, 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 400 (1948) (In the Daily case, loss of support
was clearly pleaded while in this case the father was meeting his obligation of
financial support under a separate maintenance order, and this decision is a
closer recognition of the destruction of the family unit as giving rise to a
separate tort).
16 Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281 (S.D. Mich. 1949) (child allowed action
since the court held that the Michigan statute forbidding alienation of affections
actions applied only to the injured spouse and did not bar an action by the child
against the enticer).
17 Pound, The Spirit of The Common Law 182 (1921).
is Lippman, Breakdown of Consortium, 30 Col. L. Rev. 651-73 (1930).
19 Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281 (S.D. Mich. 1949).
203 BI. Comm. 143; Prosser, Torts, 936-37 (1941). 4 Vernier, American
Family Laws 56 (1935).
21 Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947); Michaels v.
Flach, 197 App. Div. 478, 189 N.Y. Supp. 908 (1921). N.D. Rev. Code §14-0908
(1943). Note, 19 Miss. L. Rev. 114 (1947); Madden, Persons and Domestic Rela-
tions 383-84 (1931).
22Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949).
23 Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945); Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn.
400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949).
24 Paxton v. Paxton, 150 Cal. 673, 89 Pac. 1083 (1907).
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probable that by statutory recognition of the parental duty to support
the child in North Dakota,-one interfering with this legally enforceable
right would be liable to a suit in tort based on a statute forbidding "the
abduction or enticement of a husband from a wife, or of a parent from
his child." 2.
Expansion of consortium to include the child's right in the family affec-
tions poses the serious question of whether a parent could recover for
enticement of the child from the home on the same theory that family
rights and duties are mutual and reciprocal. 27 Weighing possibilities
of excessive litigation, blackmail, and fraud against present rights in
the family relationship, the courts have in following the Daily case, pre-
served the security of the family and are in effect guaranteeing the
quality of future adult citizens by assuring the child a right to keep the
home safe from invasion by strangers of the consortium of the family
entity.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS - LICENSES - ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - RIGHT
OF APPEAL FRoM ADMINISTRATIVE RULING REVOKING LIQUOR LICENSE.
Under the provisions of Chapter 5-05, N.D. Rev. Code (Supp. 1949), the
Attorney General of North Dakota revoked the appellant's liquor li-
cense for violation of North Dakota statutes relating to the sale of
liquor. The defendant appealed from the revocation order to district
court, demanding a complete trial de novo, but at the district court hear-
ing only the evidence presented before the Attorney General's agent was
considered, on the theory that the appeal was governed. by the North
Dakota Administrative Agencies Uniform Practice Act,' and that no
new evidence could therefore be presented. The revocation was upheld.
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court held, that the appeal to dis-
trict court should have involved a trial de novo of the entire- issue in
view of N.D. Rev. Code §5-0515 (Supp. 1949), which provided that re-
vocations ". . . may be appealed to the district court . . .by procedure
applicable to appeals from justice court.. ." The judgment was reversed
and a new trial granted. In re Guon, 38 N.W.2d 280 (N.D. 1949).
It- is clear that were it not for the unfortunate wording of the statute
in this case, the better holding would be that the right of appeal from
the decision of the Attorney General should be limited to a review by the
courts based solely upon the record at the hearing. 2 As early as 1926,
25 N.D. Rev. Code §14-0908 (1943).
28 N.D. Rev. Code 1114-0206 and 14-1004 (1943) (providing for the enforce-
ment of a minor's rights by civil action).
27 Montgomery v. Cram, 199 Ind. 30, 161 N.E. 251 (1928); Pyle v. Waechter,
202 Iowa 695, 210 N.W. 926 (1926) (denying parent recovery for alienation of
child's affections). Restatement, Torts, §699 (1934) (expressly negatives a cause
of action in the parent for alienation of affections of the child).
1 N.D. Rev. Code c. 28-32 (1943).
2 As the court recognized in the instant case, "The Administrative Agencies
Uniform Practice Act is a comprehensive measure purporting to prescribe the
procedure on hearings before administrative agencies and on appeals from the
determinations of such agencies." In te Guon, 38 N.W.2d 280, 282 (N.D. 1949).
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the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that the Attorney General was
an administrative officer,s and it is manifest that such functions as he
performs in revoking licenses were originally intended to come under the
provisions of the North Dakota Administrative Agencies Uniform
Practice Act.4 The courts which have considered this type of problem
have repeatedly said that the right of appeal from such an administra-
tive ruling should be determined on the basis of statutory construction. 5
Certain basic principles of law relating to intoxicating liquors have,
however, guided their decisions. A fundamental concept is that a license
to sell liquor is a mere personal privilege in the licensee and not a prop-
erty right.6 The courts have uniformly held that the state legislatures
or the administrative agencies to which quasi-llegislative power in this
field has been delegated may condition the exercise of this privilege upon
the observance by the licensee of such rules as the legislature or admin-
istrative agency may find necessary to protect the public interest. 7 No
right- is taken away when a person is denied the privilege of selling
liquor.8 A number of courts in deciding cases involving the scope of
review from administrative action revoking liquor licenses have declared
that a trial de novo should not be allowed. 9 The cases so holding contend
that new evidence should be introduced only when the liquor control
board or commission acted arbitrarily, illegally, or contrary to law.' 0
The attitude of these courts toward administrative agencies is well sum-
marized in a California case involving another aspect of administrative
3 See Mountrail County v. Farmer's State Bank, 53 N.D. 789, 793, 208 N.W.
380, 381 (1926).
4 The North Dakota Administrative Agencies Uniform Practice Act provides
that the words: "'Administrative Agency' or 'the agency' shall include any
officer, board, commission, bureau, department, or tribunal other than a court,
having state-wide jurisdiction and authority to make any order, finding, deter-
mination, award, or assessment which has the force and effect of law and which
by statute is subject to review in the courts of this state." N.D. Rev. Code
§28-3201 (1943).
5 Blum v. Ford, 194 Ark. 393, 107 S.W.2d. 340 (1937); Covert v. State Board
of Equalization, 162 P.2d 545 (Cal. App. 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 29
Cal. 2d 125, 173 P.2d 545 (1946); Neubauer v. Liquor Control Commission, 128
Conn. 113, 20 A.2d 669 (1941). Contra: City of Freepor v. Kaiser, 311 I1.
App. 197, 35 N.E.2d 722 (1941); In re Revocation of Retail Dispenser's Eating
Place License No. E-914, 149 Pa. Super. 97, 25 A.2d 778 (1942).
O Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 (1890); Wylie v. State Board of
Equalization- of California, 21 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Cal. 1937); People v.
Jemnez, 49 Cal. App. 2d 739, 121 P.2d 543 (1942); Zecherman v. Driscoll, 133
N.J.L. 586, 45 A.2d 620 (1946).
7 Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 30.8 U.S. 132 (1939); Thielen v. Kostelecky, 69 N.D.
410, 287 N.W. 513 (1939); Wylie v. State Board of Equalization of California,
supra note 6; State v. Andre, 101 Mont. 366, 54 P.2d 566 (1936); State v. Brown,
40 S.D. 372, 167 N.W. 400 (1918).
s Bradley v. Texas Liquor Control Board, 108 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937). Revocation of a liquor licence is outside the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Note, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 306 (1948).
9 Covert v. State Board of Equalization of California, 162 P.2d 645 (Cal.
App. 1945); Neubauer v. Liquor Control Commission, 128 Conn. 113, 20 A.2d
669 (1941); Bradley v. Texas Liquor Control Board, 108 S.W.2d 300 (Tex Civ.
App. 1937).
10 Stone v. Farish, 199 Miss. 186, 23 So.2d 911 (1946); Chiordi v. Jernigan,
46 N.M. 396, 129 P.2d 640 (1942).
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law: "Courts should let administrative boards and officers work out their
problems with as little judicial interference as possible. They may decide
a particular question wrong - but it is their question. Such boards are
vested with a high discretion, and its abuse must appear very clearly
before courts will interfere." 11
At least one court has reached a result which appears flatly in con-
flict with the North Dakota decision. In Bradley v. Texas Liquor Control
Board12 the Texas court of civil appeals held that the revocation of a
liquor license was not a judicial act, but was instead purely administra-
tive in character. "The cancellation of a permit to sell liquor under the
Liquor Control Act and the principle of law governing such matters is
not a civil suit or cause of action; but the power and authority to cancel
such a permit is merely the exercise of an administrative function and
duty imposed by the act upon the board of its administrator." is On this
basis trial de novo was denied although the statute specifically required
it, the court reasoning that to review all of the facts would substitute
the court's discretion for that of the administrative officers, and would
mean the court was performing nonjudicial functions. The Bradley
case^highlights the difficulty of the instant case. Under the present
holding the decision of the Attorney General, the official specifically
charged with responsibility for liquor license control, is of no weight
if an appeal is taken.14 Admitting the possibility that the court is correct
in its decision as a matter of statutory interpretation, i s it appears to
have overlooked one of the prime reasons favoring the administrative
approach to the problem, which is that the officers entrusted with the
task of administering liquor licenses can become experts in the field and
thus provide greater uniformity of decisions1s The instant decision,
however, reflects the habits of North Dakota courts in giving broader
review to administrative actions than has been accorded in other juris-
dictions.17 The probable answer to the problem raised by the case is an
amendment to N.D. Rev. Code §5-0515 (Supp. 1949), providing that
appeals should be taken in such cases under the Administrative Agencies
Uniform Practice Act.
11 Maxwell v. Civil Service Commission, 169 Cal. 336, 339, 146 Pac. 869, 871
(1915).
12 108 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
is Id. at 302.
14 Since procedure applicable on appeals from justice court is to be used in
appeals from liquor license revocations, it is interesting to note that in the
recent case of Nomland Motor Co. v. Alger, 39 N.W.2d 809 (N.D. 1949), the
court specifically held that the district court exercised original jurisdiction as
if the cause had been initiated there when it considered appeals from justice
court.
*- In N.D. Rev. Code §5-0515 (Supp. 1949), the word "may" is used in saying
that revocations "may be appealed to district court . . . by procedure applic-
able to appeals from justice court . . ." The word "may" is not necessarily
mandatory, even when used in statutes. Taffey v. New Jersey State Firemen's
Ass'n, 118 N.J.L. 357, 192 Atl. 725 (1937); State v. Christianson, 179 Minn. 337,
229 N.W. 313 (1930); Rowenhorst v. Johnson, 48 S.D. 325, 204 N.W. 173 (1925).
1e See Metzler, The Growth of Administrative Law, 19 Marq. L. Rev. 209,
216-20 (1936).
-17 See Comment, 24 N.D. Bar Briefs 211 (1948).
CASE NOTES
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - RIGHT OF INFANT TO SUE FOR PRENATAL
INJURIES. The plaintiff's mother, a paying passenger on a bus operated
by the defendant, was injured through the defendant's negligence. The
mother died but the plaintiff, born prematurely after the accident, suf-
fered permanent injuries for which an action was brought. A demurrer
to the complaint was sustained in the trial court but was overruled in
the Court of Appeals. Upon certification to the Ohio supreme court it
was held, that a right of action accrues to ail infant at birth for in-
juries received while the infant is a viable foetus en ventre sa mere. The
infant at the time of injury had reached such a stage of viability and
development that the death of the mother could not have deprived it of
life and thus it was a person in the eyes of the law. Williams v. Marion
Rapid Transit, 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
Although the decision in the instant case, which overrules prior Ohio
precedent,1 is not without merit,2 most Cases support the opposite view.
The leading decision on the subject, Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northamp-
ton,4 held for the defendent in a case where the child was not viable and
the injury was not directly to the child but was transmitted through the
mother. This case has been distinguished from cases where the infant
was viable when the injury was received, 5 but the great majority of the
courts have blindly followed the path paved by Mr. Justice Holmes, who
wrote the Dietrich decision. The prevailing rule, as best illustrated in
Drobner v. Peters,6 is that an unborn infant has no right of action for
injuries received while still in its mother's womb, because of the follow-
ing reasons: (1) the infant is not a person in ese; (2) it is too difficult
to prove proximate cause of the injury; (3) the possibility of fraud is
too great; (4) there is a lack of precedent; and (5) the infant is not a
separate entity from its mother and therefore there is no duty owing
to the child. The argument against recovery appears to be founded for
the most part upon the idea that an unborn infant is not a person in ease
and therefore is incapable of bringing suit. Courts which follow this
line of reasoning, however, quarrel with other fields of the law. In the
criminal law, statutory enactment in some jurisdictions has made the
I Mays v. Weingarten, 82 N.E.2d 421 (Ohio App. 1948).
2 Frey, Injuries to Infants En Ventre Sa Mere, 12 St. Louis L. Rev. 85 (1927);
24 Notre Dame Law. 409 (1949); 63 Harv. L. Rev. 173 (1949); 34 Minn. L. Rev.
65 (1949).
$ Stanford v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926); Allaire v.
St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); Smith v. Luckhardt, 299
Ill. App. 100, 19 N.E.2d 446 (1939); Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 60,
274 N.W. 710 (1937); Buel v. United Rys., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913);
Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 Ai2d 489 (1942); Drobner v. Peters, 232
N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921) (Mr. Justice Cardozo dissented); Nugent v.
Brooklyn H. Ry., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N.Y. Supp. 367 (1913); Berlin v. J. C.
Penny Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A2d 28 (1940); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169,
49 Atl. 704 (1901); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347,
78 S.W.2d 944 (1935); Walkr v. 3reat N. Ry., 28 L.R. Ir. 69 (1891). Cf. Die-
trich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884); Lipps v. Milwaukee
Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272,159 N.W. 916 (1916).
4 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
5 See the dissenting opinion of Boggs, J., in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184
I1. 359, 56 N.E. 638, 642 (1900).
6 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
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killing of a quickened child by abortion a form of manslaughter.? And
in some states, it is murder if an infant is born alive and later dies of
prenatal injuries.8 It becomes an anomalous situation when the criminal
law will exact a punishment for prenatal injuries but the infant itself
is unable to gain restitution in a civil suit for the same act.9 In the field
of property and in general the child is considered in esse for purposes
beneficial to it.1
°
Serious consideration should be given the problem of proof of proxi-
mate cause. In Montreal Tramways v. Leveille," where the plaintiff
was born with club feet, six of nine doctors testified that the defendant's
negligence might not have been the proximate cause. Recovery was al-
lowed in that case on the basis of the testimony of the other three doc-
tors. However, in Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan,12 where the
facts almost without doubt show causal connection,13 the court refused
recovery because of the difficulty of proof and the possibility of fraud,
which in fact is closely related to.the difficulty of proof. The burden of
proof, however, is upon the plaintiff and it is for him to make out his
case.1" Some courts, in cases where the mother was a passenger on a
common carrier, have held that there can be no recovery for prenatal
injuries because the carrier had no contractual obligation to the infant.15
It is said, however, that in this instance the duty arises in tort and no
contract is needed.1e
The instant case cites with favor a dissent in Allaire v. St. Luke's
Hospital,17 which is the pioneer opinion opposing the general rule. In
the dissent, the, question of viability was first raised. As a general rule,
it now appears to be conceded that no infant can be born viable or
capable of living until five months after conception and even at seven
months the chances of surviving six hours are against the child.18 The
distinction is an important one since it appears settled that a non-viable
infant has no right of action.' 9
7 N.D. Rev. Code 112-2502 (1943).
8 Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 So. 671 (1898).
9 See Winfield, Tke Unborn Child, 4 Toronto L.J. 278, 292 (1942).
10 Frey, Injuries to Infants En Ventre Sa Mere, 12 St. Louis L. Rev. 85, 87
(1927).
114 D.L.R. 337 (1933).
12 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935).
is In this case, a pregnant mother while driving a car was struck by a truck
owned by the defendent. The woman's car was thrown against another car and
as a result the mother was crushed against the steering wheel. One of a pair
of twins later born prematurely was injured and died.
14 See 1 Beven, Negligence in Law 75 (3d ed. 1908).
15 Stanford v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So 566 (1926); Newman
v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937); Buel v. United Rys.,
248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913); Nugent v. Brooklyn H. Ry., 154 App. Div.
667, 139 N.Y. Supp. 367 (1913); Walker v. Great N. Ry., 28 L.R. Ir. 69 (1891).
is 1 Beven, Negligence in Law 75 (3d ed. 1908).
27 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
's DeLee and Greenhill, Principles and Practice of Obstetrics 41 (9th ed.
1949).
.. 19 Stanford v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926); Dietrich
v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884); Lipps v. Milwaukee
Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916).
CASE NOTES
Recovery for prenatal injuries has been allowea in a few scattered
cases.20 However, all of these, except the instant case have been based
upon a statutory construction. While North Dakota courts have appar-
ently not tried a case in point, the statutes contain a provision 21
similar to the ones upon which recovery has been allowed in other juris-
dictions. The North Dakota statutes further provide that an unborn
child is to be deemed an existing person so far as may be necessary for
its interests in the event of its subsequent birth.2 2 In view of these
statutes it is probable that North Dakota would follow the minority rule.
20 Bonbretz v. Kotz, 65 F.Supp. 138 (D.C. 1946); Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal.
App.2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939); Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So.2d 352 (La.App.
1923, belatedly reported in 1949); Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn.
1949); Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 4 D.L.R. 337 (1933).
21 N.D. Rev. Code §32-2101 (1943).
22 N.D. Rev. Code 114-1015 (1943).
